PUBLIC REASON AND DUTY OF CIVILITY: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE IGNORANTIA IURIS NON EXCUSAT

Abstract

The essay searches for a particular reason to justify the old principle ignorantia iuris non excusat within the framework of a democratic and constitutional state. It assumes that John Rawls’ political philosophy provides one of the most coherent explanations of this framework. Hence, it examines some crucial Rawlsian concepts: the «pragmatic» starting point, the fact of pluralism, the public reason approach and the duty of civility. It concludes that these concepts justify a constraint on the kind of arguments a citizen may rely on in any social conflict: we must use relevant and legitimate reasons, and exclude reasons coming from our conception of the good. Rawls identifies this set of public arguments with «fair terms of cooperation», norms and rules enacted by the political procedure. It means every citizen must show a degree of caution and vigilance, and search for enough information on the content of law. The final section of the article deals with the problems related to the content and scope of this duty