IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE (BUT SOMETIMES ACTUALLY IT DOES)

Abstract

Ignorance of the law excuses no one is one of the most recurrent legal aphorisms. But does it remain good law? We argue in this paper that to ascertain the normative value of «ignorance of the law excuses no one» requires going beyond doctrinal rhetoric, an in particular, setting aside the fictions, meta-fictions and assumptions on the basis of which a full assessment of the real value of the aphorism, which should take seriously the complexity of the legal system, is frequently avoided. We start by dissecting the structure and effects of the paradigmatic types of legal norms. We then consider what should be understood by subjective ignorance of the law, and what implications should be drawn when ignorance is actually ascertained. We conclude that the fact that «ignorance of the law excuses no one» is enshrined in Section 6.1 of the Spanish Civil Code does not make the aphorism less indeterminate and, consequently, less irrelevant in actual legal practice. The same conclusion should be extended to the reference that can be found in the same Section of the Code to errors in law and in fact, and to their normative implications. Moreover, the framework regulation of nullity and its exceptions, contained in Section 6.3 of the Spanish Civil Code, does not alter the specific effects that are to be assigned to ignorance of the law according to specific legal provisions