FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIARY IN THE CASE LA MANADA

Abstract

The sentence handed down in the criminal order in the case of La Manada raises various questions related to the constitutional scope. The first is related to the subjection of the sentencing court to the principles of independence and responsibility and, therefore, to the principle of neutrality. The sentence does not offer reproach to these principles. However, it shows a remarkable incoherence between the facts that it declares proven and the criminal classification attributed. On the other hand, the content of the dissenting vote raises the question of the judge’s freedom of speech when exercising judicial functions and forces to question the system of selection of judges in Spain. Finally, the social impact of this ruling encourages reflection on two issues: the pathology of so-called parallel trials and the responsibility of some media, especially regarding the protection of the rights of the personality and the presumption of innocence of the processed; and on the role of the audiovisual regulatory authorities to avoid the excesses of irresponsible information