VINDICATION OF KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF LAW AND CRIME: AFTER FREEDOM

Abstract

This article reflects on the validity of reason and freedom in Kantian thought —meaningfully political freedom—, along with a critical approach on certain aspects of the evolving conceptual system, what is surrounded by the contradiction between the Kantian conception of the crime and the punishment. However, the text warns that this contradiction is not the reason of the decline of the Kantian ideas of the law and the crime endorsed by the role given to the freedom in this construction. It demands that conception otherwise. In line with this, the article holds that denying the Kantian program for universal freedom does not arises from their internal contradictions, but on the part of a movement of contesting it such as within the dimension of material history, such as the history of human thinking. Regarding criminal law, struggling against the liberal criminal law. Besides this, the text examines the attack against the reason and its confrontation between factuality and validity. Focused on the philosophical and legal reasoning, traceable with the critical to the Kantian paradigm from Heidegger to Welzel along with different variants of hermeneutics, which transform the factuality in normativity in different ways. At the same time the idea of the so-called «Criminal law for the enemy» becomes another link within the authoritarian struggle against the rule of law