The Immunities of the Members of the French Legislative and Executive Branches: an Impossible Balance?

Authors

  • Hubert Alcaraz Professor of Public Law, Universidad de Pau y de los Países del Adour

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36151/td.2021.030

Keywords:

France, immunity, irresponsibility, inviolability, constitution, revision, president of the Republic, minister, parliamentarian

Abstract

Like many constitutional texts, the French Constitution of October 4, 1958 establishes immunities for the benefit of members of the executive power and the legislative power. Of two types —irresponsibility and inviolability— these immunities protect a function and are framed by the Constitution. However, both have sometimes sparked debate, sometimes even provoking constitutional revisions in an attempt to strike a better balance between the concern not to confer undue privileges on the rulers and the concern to ensure them a protection adapted to the exercise of their functions, without neglecting the difficulties linked to the moralization of political life.

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Portada nº 31

Published

2021-12-31

How to Cite

Alcaraz, H. (2021). The Immunities of the Members of the French Legislative and Executive Branches: an Impossible Balance?. Teoría & Derecho. Revista De Pensamiento jurídico, (31), 298–317. https://doi.org/10.36151/td.2021.030