On Artificial Intelligence, Judicial Decisions and Argumentation Voids

Authors

  • Dyango Bonsignore Fouquet Assistant Lecturer of Criminal Law, Universidad de Alicante

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36151/td.2021.011

Keywords:

Artifical Intelligence, algorithms, machine learning, opacity, judicial decision-making, legal argumentation

Abstract

In recent decades, we have witnessed a veritable explosion in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), the popularization of which has become particularly visible in recent times. One of the most interesting applications of this technology can be found in the legal field. This article aims to reflect on a small part of the Law-IA relationship, namely that which concerns judicial decision-making. To this end, two hypotheses are examined: one that envisages the replacement of the human judge by an artificial intelligence, and another that understands the use of the latter as a complement or support for the judge throughout the decision-making process. Regarding the first issue, it reflects on the difficulties posed by the concept of «reason» when applied to the human and artificial decision-maker, and how this impacts on the jurisdictional function as a peer-to-peer activity. In relation to the second question, the paper highlights the potential that the use of AI as a support can come with its own difficulties. Reflecting through the example of criminal justice and recidivism predictions, it is argued that the use of such tools can produce «argumentation voids», i.e., blind spots in the justification of the judicial decision.

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Published

2021-06-14

How to Cite

Bonsignore Fouquet, D. (2021). On Artificial Intelligence, Judicial Decisions and Argumentation Voids. Teoría & Derecho. Revista De Pensamiento jurídico, (29), 248–277. https://doi.org/10.36151/td.2021.011